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ARGUMENf

I.

THE STEEDS' ARGUMENTS HAVE NEITHER BEEN
WAIVED NOR FALL OUTSIDE THE MANDATE.

The State argues that the Steeds cannot seek return of monies that were
~

paid pursuant to the now-reversed convictions because, although the Steeds appealed the convictions, they did not ask that the consequences of the convictions
also be vacated. This is like arguing that the convictions can be reversed but the
sentence must stand because the defendants did not ask to be let out of jail. Like
the incarceration orders, the challenged payments were incidents of the convictions themselves; thus, when the convictions were reversed those penalties that
were jurisdictionally dependent on the convictions were likewise reversed.

In essence, the State is asking the Court to require an appellant to supply
an itemized list of all conceivable consequences of reversal, or be forever subject
,.,;;,

to those consequences even though they have no underlying legal foundation.
·Even the State acknowledges that the prison terms, the fines, the probation, and

:.J

the supervision requirements do not_ ~urvive the reversal. It is illogical to treat
the other consequences of the very same conviction orders any differently.

In the present case, the underlying notices of appeal identified the final
judgments of conviction (R. 959-61 Goan); 1334-36 (Frank)), which included the
probation conditions at issue here. The probation conditions were integral consequences of the judgments appealed from, and their reversal is inherent in the

reversal of those judgments of conviction. Indeed, a bare II conviction" without
the accompanying sentencing is not even a final order for purposes of appeal.

See State v. Ingleby, 2004 UT App 447, ,r 10, 104 P.3d 657.
The State cites UDOT v. Ivers, 2009 UT 56, 218 P.3d 583, for the proposition

Gu

that the mandate rule required the trial court to enter judgments of acquittal but ..
precluded the trial court from undoing the consequences of the reversed orders.
The Ivers case, however, does not stand for that proposition. In Ivers, the mandate was to determine whether the already-condemned land was necessary to
the highway project and if so to award severance damages. On remand, UDOT
attempted to change the scope of the take, an action the court held impermissible. 2009 UT 56, if 1 14, 16.
The State also cites J. Pochynok Co. v. Smedsrud, 2007 UT App 88, 157 P.3d
822, for the same proposition. In Smedsrud, however, the question was whether
the trial court was free to reconsider a garnishment order that had been specifically appealed and affirmed. Obviously, it was not. 2007 UT App 88, ,r 16.
The foregoing cases do not preclude the trial court from undoing the consequences of the reversed orders. Neither the waiver doctrine nor the mandate
doctrine require the result the State seeks here. Rather, logic and common sense
demand that unwinding the consequences of the reversed orders is inherent in,
and indeed required by, the mandate to enter judgments of acquittal. To do oth-
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erwise would allow for the imposition of criminal penalties and consequences in
~

the absence of criminal convictions.
II.

THE STATE TAX COMMISSION IS NOT A SEPARATE
LEGAL ENTITY FOR PURPOSES OF THIS CASE.

The State's second argument is that the State Tax Commission is a nonparty to the case and therefore cannot be compelled to return the funds it re~

ceived pursuant to the trial court's restitution order. The State cites State v. Lang,
2009 UT 35, 212 P.3d 529, for the obvious proposition that the State is a party to a
criminal case. The case actually involved an attempt by a victim to file a notice of
appeal and stands for the proposition that the victim is not a party to a criminal
case. 2009 UT 35, 1 16.
The State cites no authority in support of its argument that the tax commission is a legal entity separate from the State. There is nothing in the code to
suggest that the commission, which collects taxes for the State of Utah, is separate from the State. The State cites no statute that requires the commission to

'ii

segregate income tax funds and associated penalties, or to otherwise maintain a
barrier or distinction between itself and the State.
To the contrary, the code provides that the commission "shall represent
the state in a matter pertaining to the collection of a tax, fee, or charge." UTAH
CODE§

59-1-1403(6). This suggests that, in the context of collection of taxes and

penalties-which is the context here if the restitution order is disregarded- the
-3-

commission is the State. And that is consistent with the way this case was prosecuted: the tax commission investigated it and provided the information to Mr.

4"'

Baer who, although he works for the attorney general, is assigned to the tax
commission and handles tax cases.
Next, the State relies on the statutory process for obtaining a refund of a
tax or penalty assessed by the commission. See UTAH CODE§ 59-1-1410(8). The
cited code section provides a civil process for the commission to assess a tax, fee,
or charge, provides that the commission may not do so after three years have
passed, and describes the process one must follow to obtain a refund of an assessment imposed under those circumstances. By laying out certain procedures,
the code ensures that an individual receives adequate process and opportunity to
challenge the amount of the fee or charge. See UTAH CODE§§ 59-1-1405, -1410. In
this case, the commission did not-and now cannot because of the passage of
time-assess the penalties and interest at issue.

Rather than supporting the

State's position, the section reinforces the Steeds' position that the statutory assessment scheme and the statutory refund scheme go hand-in-hand. The refund
scheme is not applicable because the State elected not to follow the statutory assessment scheme.
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III.

THE STEEDS ARE ENTITLED TO A REFUND OF ALL
FEES AND COSTS PAID FOR PROBATION AND INCAR-

CERATION.
The State finally reaches the merits of the Steeds' arguments at page 13 of
its brief. The State's argument, however, ignores the cases cited in the Steeds'
opening brief. Those cases stand for the proposition that a judgment of acquittal
deprives the trial court of the jurisdiction to impose penalties, State v. Piekkola, 90
S.D. 335, 241 N.W.2d 563, 564 (1976), overruled on other grounds by Matter of Estate

of Erdmann, 447 N.W.2d 356 (S.D. 1989), and for the further proposition that the
touchstone for triggering the defendant's due process rights in this area is the coercive nature of the trial court's sentencing orders, State v. Lewis, 342 F. Supp. 833
~

(E.D. La. 1972), affd, 478 F.2d 835 (5th Cir. 1973).

Instead, the State attempts to sidestep the due process problem with the
argument that the Steeds owed the tax and the commission could have imposed
the penalties. It is a "no-harm no-foul" argument that characterizes the State as
having lost a "gamble" and ignores the procedural realities of the _case at hand.
Whether the commission could have imposed a penalty is irrelevant. The
fact is that it chose not to do so. Instead, the commission took a shortcut the

trial court simply imposed a 20 percent surcharge, plus interest, and threatened
the Steeds with immediate imprisonment if they did not pay it. This is not the
~

statutory assessment process. It is the coercive process of criminal sentencing.
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The statutory civil process was not triggered and the Steeds were not afforded a
forum to argue that a penalty was not appropriate, or that the penalty was excessive under the circumstances. 1
The State correctly argues that the obligation to pay penalties does not
II

¼iJ'

depend" on a criminal conviction or imposition of a restitution order. While in
the abstract neither conviction nor restitution is required in order for the commission to assess a penalty, that abstraction has no place here. Here, the penalty
udepends" on the restitution order because restitution incident to the convictions
was the basis the State chose for imposition of the penalties. The commission did
not assess the penalty based on civil process or a statutory proceeding.

In a parallel argument, the State argues that the Steeds had independent
11

C?bligations" to pay the penalties and interest. This is simply incorrect. No obligation to pay penalties and interest arose under the tax code until assessment by
the commission. See UTAH CODE§§ 59-1-1401 et seq. (containing procedures for
assessments. The code affords the State a statutory civil process for imposing the

In the federal system prior to 2010, the I.RS. routinely pursued separate civil
assessments independent of the criminal conviction to determine the amount of
tax liability. See, e.g., Office of Chief Counsel, Internal Revenue Service, Memo
No. 200734020, at 4-5 (Oct. 2, 2006), available at https://www.irs.gov/pub/irswd/0734020.pdf (distinguishing between civil and criminal orders). In 2010,
C~ngress amended the Internal Revenue Code to clarify that restitution could be
awarded in criminal cases involving violations of federal tax law, but provided
that the I.R.S. - rather than the court charged with sentencing- would civilly as. sess the restitution amount, and only after criminal appeals had been exhausted.
See 26 U.S.C. § 6201(a)(4).
1
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penalties. The process would also have afforded the Steeds their due process
~

rights. The process was not followed, however, so no statutory obligation exists.
Finally, the State argues that the only effect of the acquittals was to ensure

~

that the Steeds would not go to prison if they violated the restitution order. This
argument simply illustrates the ridiculous result that follows if a judgment of acquittal does not remove the jurisdictional premise for imposition of fines, penalties, and restitution. The State is correct that the acquittals did not excuse the
Steeds from obeying the law, but the State is incorrect to insist that the acquittals
did not excuse the Steeds from the requirements of the restitution order that was
premised on the now-reversed convictions.
IV.

EVEN IN THE CASE OF RESTITUTION PAID TO NONp ARTIES, THE BEITER POLICY APPROACH IS TO REQUIRE RETURN OF THE FUNDS FROM THE STATE.

Although this case does not present the question whether or how restitution payments should be recovered from a non-governmental third-party victim,
the Steeds recognize that that question lurks in the background of this case and is
at least tangentially raised by the issue of the recovery of the II pay-for-stay"
funds from Wasatch County. The issue was confronted in State v. Parker, 872
P.2d 1041 (1994), but the resulting decision-discussed extensively in the Steeds'
opening brief- is so fractured that no clear guiding principle emerges from it.

-7-

The Colorado appellate courts recently grappled with this issue in People v.
Nelson, 2013 COA 58, 2013 WL 1760903 (Colo. Ct. App. 2013), rev'd, 2015 CO 68,

362 P.3d 1070 (Colo. 2015). The case involved a defendant who had been convicted of child abuse through the testimony of a forensic interviewer who should

lii.J

not have been qualified as an expert. The conviction was reversed, and then the
defendant was acquitted in a second trial. In the interim, however, she had been
incarcerated and had paid restitution and other costs associated with the conviction. The trial court denied her request for return of those funds.
The court of appeals reversed the trial court. It held that the defendant
was entitled to seek recovery of not just fines and penalties, but all funds paid as
restitution, reasoning that the trial court had an obligation to vacate all aspects of
the overturned conviction because the state had "failed to prove that the defendant is guilty." 2013 COA 58, 1 20. The court went on to hold that the repayment
should come from the state, not the ultimate recipient of the restitution, reasoning persuasively:
In reaching our conclusion here, we are not unmindful of the
fact that in certain cases, the state may be required to refund monies
that it has already disbursed to third parties (i.e., people and entities
not controlled by the state). For several reasons, however, we believe that such a result is reasonable and appropriate.
First, it was the state's action that ultimately resulted in the
wrongful payment of restitution.
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Second, when the state chose to disburse the funds, it necessarily assumed the risk that the conviction could ultimately be overturned.
Third, we do not believe it appropriate to create a scenario in
which former criminal defendants are left to seek out and file lawsuits or other proceedings against third parties, and especially crime
victims, to recover the restitution amounts that the defendants previously paid.
Fourth, when a former defendant seeks a refund from the
state, there is nothing to preclude the state, in its discretion, from
seeking to recover such restitution amounts from the third parties,
and we view this as a more palatable option, given that the state
would have had prior dealings with the victims and any service
providers. In addition, the state would be in the best position to assess whether the amount of the restitution at issue or the impact on
the victims or service providers justifies any effort to recover such
funds.
Finally, in a situation like that present here, where either the
former defendant or the state must bear the risk of a wrongly paid
restitution award, we believe that the risk should rest with the state,
which collected the restitution funds but then ultimately failed to
prove its case and which would likely be better able to bear the risk.
2013 COA 58, 11 28-33.

The Colorado Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals. While not
disagreeing that the defendant was entitled to return of restitution,2 it held that
the defendant could not pursue that claim by motion in the criminal case, in part
~

because the state constitution and prior case law prevented Colorado courts from
u

authorizing a refund from public funds without statutory authority to do so."

Colorado has previously held, in People v. Hargrave, 179 P.3d 226, 229-30 (Colo.
Ct. App. 2007), that the trial court has ancillary jurisdiction to entertain a postconviction motion for the return of property.
2

-9-

2015 CO 68, ,r 34. Applying this principle, the court held that she was required to
file a separate suit under the Colorado Exoneration Act, which provides a remedy for those who are II factually innocent" but wrongfully convicted. Id.,

,r 44.

In a dissent, Justice Hood methodically dismantled the majority's reasonmg. He noted that the Exoneration Act places the burden on the defendant to
prove factual innocence by clear and convincing evidence, and thus reverses the
presumption of innocence that should be available to the acquitted defendant

2015 CO 68, Dissent

,r 12.

no conviction at all." Id.,

"[R]eversal is reversal. And an invalid conviction is

,r 9.

"ffiust as the State was required to release Nelson

from incarceration, it should also be required to release Nelson's money paid as
costs, fees, and restitution." Id.,

,r 6.

11

Refunds simply recognize that the legisla-

ture lacks power to punish people who have not been validly convicted." Id.,

,r 21.
Utah's Post-Conviction Remedies Act, UTAH CODE §§ 78B-9-101 et seq., is
not susceptible to the majority's analysis in Nelson, and thus reinforces the conclusion that the reasoning of the court of appeals and of the dissent is more persuasive. Utah's act, like Colorado's, reverses the burden of proof, requiring the
claimant to prove factual innocence by clear and convincing evidence. Id., § 78B9-404(1 )(b). Both acts provide for a specific monetary remedies. Id., § 78B-9-
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405(1)(a). Unlike Colorado, however, the Utah Act is silent on the question of refund of fines, restitution, and other penalties.
Most importantly, however, the Utah Act only applies to a person uwho
has exhausted all other legal remedies, including a direct appeal ...." Id., § 78B9-102. See also § 78B-9-106(1)(a) (I.I A person is not eligible for relief under this
chapter upon any ground that may still be raised on direct appeal ...."). The
remedy under the Utah Act is only available to "[a] person who has been convicted of a felony offense .... " Id., § 78B-9-402(1). The Steeds, however, have
not been convicted. A jury found them guilty, but the trial court's order was reversed on appeal and a judgment of acquittal was entered. The Steeds were not
convicted and then acquitted or found factually innocent. They were acquitted.
By its plain language, the Post-Conviction Remedies Act is not applicable to a
person who was not convicted ... Consequently, the remedies and process spelled
out in the Act have no application to the Steeds. Although not stated quite this
plainly, this is the foundational premise of Judge Hood's dissent in Nelson as
well.

Thus, to the extent the court views this case as involving a request for refund from a non-party to the criminal case, the Steeds urge the reasoning of the
Colorado Court of Appeals and Justice Hood's dissent as persuasive and rational
from a policy perspective. It is the State that accepted and disbursed the Steeds'

-11-

money knowing that the case was on appeal.3 It is therefore the State that took
the risk that its actions might be premature, and it is the State that has the ability,
and the obligation, to return the money it accepted and disbursed. Requiring a
criminal defendant.to retain counsel and to then pursue a civil case against a vietim and others is not necessary, and would be a poor policy choice.
CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendants request that this Court reverse the
trial court's judgment insofar as it refused to refund the restitution, incarceration
costs, and supe~ision fees that were imposed as a consequence of the convictions.
DATED this

Jh. day of March, 2016.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

B~B
Attorneys for Appellants
C:\NRPORTBL\IDOCS\RRP\3621942_1.DOCX:3/16/16

3 If the State lost a "gamble," it was only because it chose to disburse the restitution monies before the judgments of conviction became final. The State knew
within 12 days that the Steeds had appealed. (R. 959-61, 971-73.) It assumed the
risk of reversal when it disbursed funds without waiting for a final disposition
on appeal. See United States v. Hayes, 385 F.3d 1226, 1230 (9th Cir. 2004) ("if the
government retains the monies until the conviction becomes final and then distributes it to identifiable victims ... the defendant has no right to recover any
such sums from the government.").
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